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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utab
PAUL ERNEST JOPES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE
COUNTY RECREATION BOARD,
JUNIOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY,
MEADOW BROOK GOLF CLUB and
JOSEPH MICHAEL RILEY,

Case No.
8702

Defendants and Respondents. ,..

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Paul E. J opes commenced this suit to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained in an accident
which occurred at the Meadow Brook Golf Course in Salt
Lake County, Utah. The case was tried before the Hon-
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orable Martin M. Larson sitting with a jury. At the close
of the evidence each of the defendants moved the court
for a directed verdict. The court granted each of said
motions causing the action to be dismissed, and later denied
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. This appeal is taken
from the orders of the court granting defendants' motions
and denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
Because on an appeal of this type the evidence must
be viewed by the appellate court in light most favorable
to the plaintiff, we will state as fact those matters supported by competent credible evidence without regard to
any dispute which may exist as to some of said facts. "R"
refers to pages of the Record on Appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is a professional golfer. On the 27th day
of August, 1955, he was injured when he fell over a concrete obstruction in a narrow dimly lit hallway in the clubhouse on Meadow Brook Golf Course.
Meadow Brook Golf Course is owned and operated by
Salt Lake County through its Recreation Board. The course
is operated precisely the same as any private course in the
city. Golfers are charged admission fees for the privilege
of playing the course (R. 80, 255). Lockers are rented for
a fee (R. 80, 259). Golf clubs, balls, tees, carts and accessories are sold at competitive prices (R. 259). Golf lessons
are given for a consideration at "rates comparable with rates
charged at other public golf courses in this area" (Ex. 24P-Pg. 2, R. 255, 256). On the course is located a clubhouse
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building. In a portion of the clubhouse is located the rental
lockers. In another portion is located the golf shop concession where golf supplies are sold. Still another portion
of the clubhouse is leased out as a restaurant. The restaurant is operated by the lessee as a commercial enterprise
for profit (R. 246, Exhibit 25-P).
The golf course is managed by the defendant Joseph
Michael Riley under a contract with the Salt Lake County
Recreation Board (Ex. 24-P). Under said contract Riley
is employed as a "Golf Professional, Instructor and Manager" for the course. He is paid a salary of $3,600.00, receives a home and all utilities free of charge, and has the
exclusive right and franchise to the following concessions
at the course: "(a) sale or rent at reasonable charges all
balls, clubs, golf carts, bags andjor golf accessories of any
type, nature or description whatsoever; (b) the storage
andjor repair, cleaning or club making of any and all golf
clubs or accessories; (c) the exclusive group, class or individual instruction in golf at rates comparable with rates
charged at other public golf courses in this area * * *"
(Ex. 24-P). The contract of employment further provides,
inter alia, for the promotion and holding on the course of
"one men's open or amateur golf tournaments each year."
Riley is charged with "promotion of instruction and to
supervise, operate, improve and maintain the golf course."
The contract also enjoins upon Riley the duty to "maintain
and operate at reasonable prices a first-class golf shop"
and to "have on hand during all playing seasons an adequate supply and variety of golf balls, clubs, tees, golf carts
and other commonly used accessories for sale or rent."
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The dining room of the clubhouse is leased to Mrs.
Jessie Smith (Exhibit 25-P) under an instrument which
provides for the rental of the following premises and equipment:
"The dining room, fountain and kitchen in the
Clubhouse at the Meadow Brook Golf Course, in
Salt Lake County, Utah, together with all furniture,
fixtures, equipment, cooking utensils, hardware,
glassware, and other personal property now located
in said premises, all of which items are listed on the
inventory hereto attached and marked Exhibit 'A'."
Said lease provides for a rental of "five per cent of
the gross receipts [of the lessee] derived each month
* * * from the operation of the said premises." The
lessor retains the right to modify the percentage of the
gross receipts to be charged as rental. Rental is payable
monthly with a ten day grace period. The use of the premises under said lease is defined as follows :

"* * * [S] aid premises shall be occupied
and used exclusively for the operation of a restaurant and for the sale of food, ice cream, soda, soft
drinks, beer, candies, tobaccos and other confections."
The lessee has the right under said lease to serve any place
on the golf course.
The county derives income from the operation of the
course in substantial amounts. In 1954 it received $29,066.75. In 1955 $30,579.75 was collected and in 1956 the
course brought in $38,696.62 (R. 80). The expenses of
operation are discussed infra.
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Based on the rentals paid to the county it appears that
the restaurant leased to Mrs. Smith brought in $30,260.00,
$44,102.00 and $47,642.40 for the years 1954, 1955 and
1956 respectively, netting the county five per cent of said
amounts ( R. 80) .
At the time of plaintiff's injury the Utah Open Golf
Championship was being held at the Meadow Brook Golf
Course. This tournament was co-sponsored by the defendants Meadow Brook Golf Club and Salt Lake Junior Chamber of Commerce. The Utah Golf Association had "awarded" the tournament to Meadow Brook which undertook the
holding of the tournament (R. 263). The use of the course
for the holding of the tournament at Meadow Brook was
actually considered to be an obligation on the Recreation
Board as the owner of a course (R. 257, 261). Speaking of
the attitude of the Recreation Board and himself towards
the tournament at Meadow Brook, Riley said :

"* * * because of our obligation to golf as
a whole * * * the picture of golf * * *
and they feel the same as I do that, each club should
take a turn at putting this tournament over to stimulate and boost playing of golf; * * *" (R.
257).
The tournament at first was to be sponsored by the
defendant Meadow Brook Golf Club (R. 233) . The Salt
Lake Jaycees, however, offered to co-sponsor the tournament for one-half of the profits (R. 233, 235). Income in
the amount of $10,655.10 was derived from the holding of
the tournament (R. 76). The income was received and
expenses paid by the co-sponsors. The profits were divided
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equally between Meadow Brook Golf Club and the Salt
Lake Jaycees (R. 80, 235). Each netted about $900.00
profit (R. 74, 296, 311).
The general planning and management of the tournament was under the charge of the general committee composed of Carman Kipp of the Jaycees; Jack Gilbert of
Meadow Brook and Riley (R. 234, 286). About Riley's
place on the committee and the attitude of the two co-sponsors toward him, he said:
"They were using me of my knowledge and experience in running open tournaments" (R. 236).
The general committee in turn selected subcommittees such
as publicity, finance and social (R. 236, 237).
A number of so-called "sponsors" (not to be confused
with the co-sponsors of the tournament) were contacted
each of whom paid $25.00 in exchange for having his or
its name printed in the program (R. 287). Policies of the
tournament were formed by Kipp, Gilbert and Riley on the
general committee and the subcommittees worked under
their supervision to accomplish the work of the tournament
(R. 234, 236, 237). Programs w·ere prepared, scoreboards
erected, signs constructed and the greens put in readiness
for the play of the tournament. Invitations were sent out
to professional and amateur golfers. The plaintiff received
a written invitation and also a personal invitation from
Riley to enter and participate in the tournament (R. 114,
245). All participants (including plaintiff) were required
to pay an admission fee of $10.00 to play in the open tournament (R. 115, 245). The public was invited to view the
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tournament but was admitted only upon the purchase of
spectators tickets (R. 245). Participants and spectators
alike were allowed full use of the golf clubhouse facilities
(R. 242). The golf shop, rest rooms, and locker rooms were,
of course, an essential element of the facilities for the holding of the tournament. The dining room was used for certain activities of the tournament (including a "Calcutta"
and dinner) and the restaurant was patronized by both
golfer and spectator (R. 246).
Mr. Jopes was injured in a narrow hallway of the clubhouse which connects the restaurant with the golf shop
and locker rooms (See Exhibit 1-P). This passageway is
approximately 18 feet in length, four feet in width and runs
in a north-south direction. At the time of the accident there
was no artificial light fixture in the passage to furnish
artificial light (R. 120). The east wall of the passage was
one of the exterior walls of the building and was constructed
of glass block so as to permit the passage of natural light
into the hallway. Said glass block was laid on a concrete
foundation approximately 18 inches high. At the north
end of the hallway a concrete obstruction about 18 inches
in height protrudes into the traveled portion of the hallway one foot or more. The width of the hallway from the
outer edge of this obstruction to the west edge of the hallway is about two feet ten inches (Ex. 1-P). There is a considerable amount of traffic in the hallway and people frequently pass each other therein. Before the commencement
of the tournament Riley, one of the members of the general
committee, caused a large scoreboard to be constructed and
placed on the outside of the east wall of the passage com-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

pletely covering the glass block on said wall (Ex. 1-P).
This scoreboard which was attached directly to the glass
block prevented the passage of natural light through said
glass block and into the hallway.
The accident occurred about 3:00p.m. on the 27th day
of August, 1955 (R. 116). At the time of the accident plaintiff had completed a round of golf and had gone into the
golf shop to secure change in order to pay his caddy. There
was no change in the golf shop so he went into the restaurant where he purchased a paper cup of beer and secured
change for a $20.00 bill. The accident occurred on his return from the restaurant to the golf shop. After Jopes left
the restaurant, he started down the hallway walking north.
When he had reached about the middle of the hall two men
came out of the locker room at the north end of the passage
and walked south toward him. In order to pass them in
the hallway J opes walked to the east side of the passage.
As he came to the north end of the passage his foot struck
the concrete obstruction throwing him violently forward
and causing his shoulder to strike a 4x4 post at the north
end of the hall. This blow resulted in the severe injuries
suffered by plaintiff. These injuries necessitated surgery
and pinning of the shoulder and resulted in a permanent
partial disability at the shoulder joint.
Plaintiff's witnesses testified that it was difficult to
see in the hallway and that below the concrete foundation
where the obstruction was located it was "very dark" (R.
123, 277. 278). These witnesses though looking down the
hallway were unable to see the obstruction with the light
conditions as they were (R. 123, 278). There was evidence
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that at least two persons had tripped over the obstruction
before plaintiff's accident (R. 277, 278). Plaintiff had
passed through the hallway before but had not noticed the
obstruction-probably because of the light conditions and
because he had not been forced to walk on the east side of
the passage by other traffic. There were no signs or other
warnings whatever giving the traveler notice of the obstruction in the hallway.
Although the absence of any artificial light in the hallway and the presence of the concrete obstruction contributed considerably to the hazard, perhaps the greatest single
affirmative act contributing thereto was the construction
and erection of a scoreboard covering all of the glass portion
of the east wall of said passage. It is clear that the scoreboard was constructed and erected for the sole purpose of
the Utah Open Golf Tournament. On this point Riley said:
(R. 260)

Now, who made the scoreboard?
"A. I had it made for the express purpose of
using in the Utah Open Tournament, and it was
made for me by the County Recreation Maintenance
Department.''
"Q.

The board was erected about two weeks before the
tournament (R. 242, 243). Although actual erection of the
board was made by county employees, it is clear that its
placement was taken up by Riley with the other two members of the general committee as one of the items of business
of the tournament (R. 243, 244, 309). Kipp did not remember this, but Gilbert did (R. 309). Gilbert remembers
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a discussion as to the placement of the sign in some place
out of the wind. (Ibid.) As a matter of fact Riley testified
that the matter was even taken up with the general committee after it had been placed (R. 244). Riley's suggestion
for placement of the board and his act in having it placed
where it was brings to mind his statement that:
(R. 236)
"They [The Golf Club and the Jaycees] were
using me of my knowledge and experience in running
open tournaments."
It is clear that both Gilbert and Kipp of the general
commitee knew where the board was placed and made no
objections to its placement (R. 269, 310). It is also clear
that these men as well as numerous other Jaycees and members of the Golf Club knew of the light conditions in the
hallway following the erection of the scoreboard.

At the close of the evidence the trial court refused to
allow the case to go to the jury. The question now before
this court is whether under any view of the facts the plaintiff could recover against any one or more of the defendants.
If so, he is entitled to a new trial. "Plaintiff is entitled
to have the trial court, and this court on review, consider
all of the evidence which plaintiff is able to present and
every inference and intendment therefrom in the light most
favorable to him." Abdulkadir v. The Western Pacific
Railroad Company, (Utah, 1957), 318 P. 2d 339; Morris
v. Farnsworth Motel, (Utah, 1953), 259 P. 2d 297. We
think that the plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury on
the issue of liability as to each of the defendants. The following pages will demonstrate this.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT SALT
LAKE COUNTY.
(1) The Maintenance and Operation of Meadow

Brook Golf Course is a Proprietary Function
To Which the Doctrine of Governmental Immunity Does Not Extend.
(2) Salt Lake County in Leasing Premises For a

Restaurant Was Acting in a Proprietary Capacity and is Charged with the Same Liability
in Said Operation as Any Private Landlord
Would Be.
(3) There is Ample Evidence From Which the

Jury Could Have Found That Salt Lake
County Was Guilty of Negligence Which
Proximately Contributed to Plaintiff's Injuries.
(4) The Evidence Does Not Compel a Conclusion

That Plaintiff Was Guilty of Contributory
Negligence as a Matter of Law.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT JOSEPH MICHAEL RILEY.
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POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT MEADOW BROOK GOLF CLUB.

POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT JUNIOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT SALT
LAKE COUNTY.
(1)

The Maintenance and Operation of Meadow
Brook Golf Course is a Proprietary Function
To Which the Doctrine of Governmental Immunity Does Not Extend.

We have already stated that Meadow Brook Golf Course
is owned and operated by Salt Lake County through its
Recreation Board. The course is operated precisely the
same as any private course in the city. Golfers are charged
"green fees" for the privilege of playing the course. Lockers are rented for a fee. Golf clubs, balls, tees, carts and
accessories are sold in the golf shop. The clubhouse located
on the premises is devoted almost exclusively to commercial
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concessions and enterprises. A portion of said clubhouse
contains lockers which are rented to golfers. In another
portion is located the golf shop concession where golf supplies are sold as a profit making or business undertaking.
Still another part of the clubhouse is leased by the county
as a restaurant. The restaurant, as the golf shop, is operated by the lessee as any other commercial restaurant. In
1954 the county deposited in its treasury as revenue derived
from the operation of the course the sum of $29,066.75. In
1955 this revenue was increased to the sum of $30,579.75,
and in 1956 the sum of $38,696.62 was taken in by the
county (R. 80). The expenses incurred in operating the
course amounted to $50,309.11 in 1956, and were about the
same in 1954 and 1955 (R. 80, 81).
We think the conclusion of the trial court that the
county in operating Meadow Brook Golf Course is acting
in a proprietary capacity is wholly unsupported in fact and
law. Statutes pertinent to the suit against the county are
§17-15-10, U. C. A., 1953, (providing that a county may
sue or be sued), §11-2-3 (authorizing county to act through
recreation board), §11-2-1, U. C. A., 1953, (authorizing
maintenance of facilities such as golf courses) . The expenses of the operation are paid by the county (R. 80, See
§11-2-7, U. C. A., 1953) and the revenue derived is deposited
in the county treasury (R. 80, 255).
The principal of sovereign immunity is a common law
doctrine which insulates municipalities and agencies of the
government from liability in tort while engaged in the performance of governmental functions. From the very inception of the doctrine it has been recognized that immunity
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does not extend to activities performed by the sovereign
which are private or proprietary in nature.
The distinction between proprietary and governmental
functions is most commonly discussed in connection with
suits against a city or municipality. However, the proposition that a county as well as a city may act in a private
or proprietary capacity and is liable for its torts when so
acting is firmly established in this country. The case law
on this subject is collected in annotations at 101 A. L. R.
1166 and 16 A. L. R. 2d 1079 (See also A. L. R. 2d Supplement Service). It appears from these cases that the
question has been before the appellate courts in at least
twenty different jurisdictions. With the exception of some
Texas decisions and Georgia (where a statute controls), all
of the other decisions referred to in the above annotations
(or later decisions of the same court) have rejected the
contention that the powers of a county are purely governmental and recognized that counties, as cities, may act in
a private as well as a public capacity and that when so
acting the county has no immunity from suit. The western
states of California, Idaho, Nevada and Montana have all
recognized this principal of law. A lengthy analysis of the
cases is set forth in Granite Oil Securities v. Douglas
County, 67 Nev. 388, 219 P. 2d 191, where it was concluded
as follows:
"While it is said that the doctrine holding counties, liable for torts committed in the exercise of
proprietary functions has been of much later development than a similar doctrine for municipalities,
we find that doctrine clearly expressed in the early
case of Hannon v. County of St. Louis, 62 Mo. 313,
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decided in 1876 * * * We cite these as among
the early cases. Later cases are overwhelmingly in
support of the liability of counties for tort when
acting in their proprietary capacity. (Citing cases.)"
See also the following cases:

Coburn v. San Mateo County, 75 Fed. 520; Jones v. Jefferson County, 206 Ala. 13, 89 So. 174; Peterson v. Bannock
County, 61 Idaho 419, 102 P. 2d 647; Johnson v. Billings,
101 Mont. 462, 54 P. 2d 579; Calkins v. Newton, 36 Cal.
App. 2d 262, 97 P. 2d 523.
Although this Court has not directly passed upon the
question it is evident from the case of Lund v. Salt Lake
County, 58 Utah 546, 200 Pac. 510, that the Court recognizes the almost universal rule of county tort liability. In
that case, though holding that the county was not liable
because its act in maintaining a private water system and
furnishing water for hire was without statutory authority
and hence "ultra vires," the court said:
"* * * If they were authorized to engage
in such business, as was Salt Lake City in the Brown
case, cited by plaintiff, we see no objection to applying the common law doctrine of respondeat superior and holding the municipality liable. * * *"

It should be noted at this point that the instant case is not
a situation involving an "ultra vires" act as was the case
in Lund v. Salt Lake County, supra. The legislature has
authorized the county to operate and maintain facilities
such as golf courses ( § 11-2-1, 3 U. C. A., 1953) just as
the city was authorized to maintain and operate swimming
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•pools (§ 10-8-9, U. C. A., 1953) in the cases of Griffin v.
Salt Lake City and Burton v. Salt Lake City, infra. In the
Griffin and Burton cases it was held that the maintenance
and operation of a swimming pool by the city pursuant to
statutory authority is proprietary in nature and that the
city is liable for its negligence in said operation. The courts
have uniformly recognized that the conduct of certain
authorized enterprises by cities and counties are proprietary
in nature and in such instances the city or county in question is held liable for torts committed in the operation of
such enterprises. Having demonstrated that the overwhelming weight of authority supports the proposition that a
county (as a city) may act in a proprietary as well as a
governmental capacity, we pass to a consideration of the
character of the operation in the instant case.
Traditionally a governmental undertaking is one which
is operated for the protection of persons and property within
the limits of the governmental unit. The most typical examples are perhaps police and fire protection. Although
many of the old decisions assign as the reason for the
doctrine the theory that "the king can do no wrong" probably the real motive for affording immunity to the sovereign while engaged in a governmental undertaking is that the
function is not only enjoined by law upon the city without
its choice but it is also a necessary function, the performance of which should not be hindered by vexatious lawsuits.
A private or proprietary undertaking on the other hand is
a function the performance of which is not enjoined by law
upon the governmental unit and one which a private corporation, association or other form of business might also
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conduct. The hardship and injuries of the immunity doctrine have been discussed and deplored by many a judge
and textwriter and at least one former justice of this court
has cried out against the extension of the doctrine beyond
its present limits. See concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe
in Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P. 2d 800.
As we will point out there is no decision in this state or
any other state of the union which extends the cloak of
governmental immunity to a city or county engaged in the
operation of a public golf course for admission to which
a fee is charged. Neither the facts nor rational of any decision of this court would extend the doctrine so far. A
golf course as the court judicially knows is a type of operation traditionally and commonly undertaken by private
organizations or associations of persons.
Although the financial success is not as significant
a factor as the character of the undertaking in determining
whether a given activity is proprietary or governmental
the financial picture is not insignificant. In this connection
we point out that the revenue derived by Salt Lake County
in the operation of Meadow Brook Golf Course is very substantial and cannot be said to be merely incidental and
nominal. The course is a relatively new course (R. 226,
227) and after only a few years of operation is already
bringing in over $38,500 per year. The admitted facts indicate that the costs of operation remain about the same but
the income continues to increase. Given the same growth
had over the last year for which we have figures the County
should profit approximately $4,500.00 this year from the
operation of the course and these profits will continue to
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increase as the course grows in popularity. But even more
significant than the great amount of income derived from
the operation of the course is its character as an enterprise
that is not open to the public generally except upon the payment of an admission fee. Just as significant is the fact
that ordinary commercial enterprises are operated on the
premises.
The precise question now before the court was decided
in Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 Pac. 443. In
that case Justice Frick holding that a municipally owned
and operated swimming pool was operated in a private
capacity said:

"* * * Is it not pertinent to ask, What governmental function does Salt Lake City exercise in
conducting the bathhouses and swimming pools in
question? In what way does it discharge any governmental function? What is it that it governs or
regulates or controls of a public or governmental
character? In view of the allegations of the complaint, does the city not own, operate, and conduct
the bathhouses and swimming pools in question precisely the same as they would be conducted under
private ownership? We confess our utter inability
to perceive any act of a governmental nature which
the city exercises in owning, operating, and conducting the bathhouses and swimming pools referred to
in the complaint."
In the later case of Griffin v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah
94, 176 P. 2d 156, the court again ruled that a municipally
owned swimming pool which charged an admission fee is
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a private or proprietary undertaking. In that case the court
said:
"This is not a case of a swimming pool operated without charge in connection with some park;
but an enterprise apparently in competition with
private business, and one which could likely be operated as successfully in private ownership as in
municipal ownership. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
How this can be said to be a governmental enterprise
is beyond our ability to comprehend. Is it not pertinent to
ask here, the same questions asked by the court in the Burton case, i. e.: In what way does the city discharge any
governmental function? Is there any reason why this enterprise could not be operated as well in private ownership
as in municipal ownership? The maintenance and operation of a golf course is not a duty which devolves upon the
city. It is not part of the city's business which is the protection of persons and property, the preservation of peace
and other legitimate exercises of the police power. The
doctrine of governmental immunity has been extended (to
the dismay of some members of the court) to include the
furnishing of free recreational acivities such as free public
parks or free public sleigh riding hills. Husband v. Salt
Lake City, 92 Utah 449, 69 P. 2d 491; Alder v. Salt Lake
City, 64 Utah 568, 231 Pac. 1102; Davis v. Provo City Corporation, 1 Utah 2d 244, 265 P. 2d 415. This is decidedly an
extension of the doctrine, however, which has been carefully limited to situations where the facility is provided
free of charge to the public generally. The distinction between a public park and a golf course is pointed out in the
California case of Plaza v. City of San Mateo, infra. We
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have found no decision in this jurisdiction or in any other
state of the union which allows the conduct of a golf course
under the cloak of governmental immunity.
The character of such an operation as governmental
or proprietary has been considered by the appellate courts
of Ohio and California. In each of these cases it was held
that municipal operation of a golf course is a proprietary
function.
In Gorsuch v. City of Springfield, (Ohio) 61 N. E. 2d
898, the facts were strikingly similar to those of the instant
case. The City of Springfield, Ohio, operated a golf course
and clubhouse. Income from the operation was a little over
$11,500.00 for the years in question. Said income was
raised as it was in the instant case through green fees,
clubhouse fees and the sale of golf supplies.
The Ohio trial court, notwithstanding the fact that the
land on which the course was operated had been deeded to
Springfield in trust for the free use of the public as a park
and playground, ruled as a matter of law that the operation
was proprietary in nature. The appellate court affirmed
saying:
"It is sufficient for the present case to say that
if the city in the maintenance and operation of its
municipal golf course was directly compensated or
benefited by growth and prosperity of the city and
its inhabitants and the city had an election to do
or omit to do the acts set forth herein as shown by
the evidence, the function is private and proprietary.
"It cannot be said that the city was enjoined
by any law to maintain and operate the golf course
and club house in Snyder Park. It had an election
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to do or to omit to do so. * * * The city was
benefited by revenue received in the operation of
a business which is customarily carried on by private persons and corporations in their proprietary
capacity. * * *"
In the instant case income was over $38,500.00 from the
same sources except that in the instant case Salt Lake
County derives income not only from the sources derived
by the Springfield course but also from the commercial
operation of a restaurant.
California has adopted the same holding in the case
of Plaza v. City of San Mateo, (Cal. 1954), 266 P. 2d 523.
In the Plaza case plaintiff was struck and injured by a golf
ball while near her car in a parking lot adjacent to the golf
course operated by the defendant city. She had just completed a round of golf at the time of her injury for which
she had paid the required admission fee to the course. A
demurrer to the complaint was sustained below. The appellate court held as a matter of law that the operation of
a golf course is a private or proprietary undertaking. In
so doing it distinguished those cases wherein it had been
held that the operation of public parks and playgrounds
is governmental in character. The reasoning of the court
was as follows :
"The underlying purpose behind the playing
of a game of golf, however, is undoubtedly pleasure
or amusement. True, it provides some exercise and
gets the player out into the fresh air and sunshine,
but a walk in the park would serve the same purpose.
Golf is a game of skill and rivalry, with a decided
social aspect, and it is doubtful that most people who
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play consider health benefits to be the primary objective. Some even ride between shots in small vehicles designed for this purpose, and have caddies to
carry their clubs and equipment, which indicates
that exercise is for them not the foremost consideration. A golf course does not serve the public generally but only those who play the game. It is designed
for a single purpose, while a public park is devoted
to no specific use and serves many purposes for the
public in general. Many private golf courses are
maintained, some for profit, and others as an adjunct
to private clubs or associations. It is true that a
public golf course undoubtedly makes the sport available to a segment of our population to which private
courses would not be accessible, but this alone does
not constitute it a governmental function. It is actually in cornpe#tion with other courses, and in its
clubhouse commercial enterprises usually are carried
on where commercial rates are charged for commodities and services." (Emphasis added.)
We submit that the operation of the Meadow Brook
Golf Course is a proprietary function which differs in no
sense from the private operation of other golf courses. It
follows, we submit, that the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint as to Salt Lake County on the theory of governmental immunity.
(2) Salt Lake County in Leasing Premises For a

Restaurant Was Acting in a Proprietary Capacity and is Charged with the Same Liability
in Said Operation as Any Private Landlord
Would Be.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the maintenance of a
golf course is a governmental function there is another
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reason why the county cannot escape liability on the theory
of sovereign immunity. At the time of the plaintiff's accident a restaurant was being operated on the golf course
premises by a lessee of Salt Lake County. This was a business independent of the golf course which, as will be shown,
actually brought in more revenue to the operator than did
the course to the County. Salt Lake County (through its
Recreation Board) was in every sense of the word a landlord.
Mrs. Smith leased "the dining room, fountain and
kitchen in the clubhouse at the Meadow Brook Golf Course
* * *" (Exhibit 25-P). The rental reserved to the
county was five per cent of the gross receipts of the lessee
payable monthly.
The premises were leased for a specific purpose defined as follows :
"[S] aid premises shall be occupied and used
exclusively for the operation of a restaurant and for
the sale of food, ice cream, soda, soft drinks, beer,
candies, tobaccos and other confections."
The other provisions of the lease are such as would be
expected to be found in any commercial lease.
The county derived income from the lease as follows:
1954
1955
1956
(R. 80)

$1,513.00
$2,205.00
$2,382.12

It appears from these rentals that the restaurant grossed
$30,260.00, $44,102.00 and $47,642.40 for the years 1954,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

1955 and 1956, respectively. This operation is not merely
incidental to the operation of the course. The restaurant
actually produced more revenue than the golf course.
Leasing of premises to a private individual for a profit
making enterprise is not a governmental function. The
county, as a landlord, acts in a private or proprietary capacity in every sense of the word. From the early development of the common law doctrine of immunity, it has been
recognized that the letting of premises for hire is a private
and not a public undertaking.
In the early case of Worden v. New Bedford, 131 Mass.
23, 41 Am. Rep. 185, the City of New Bedford let a room
in the City Hall to a poultry association together with the
services of a janitor, who by appointment of the city had
charge of the building. The plaintiff was injured by the
negligence of the janitor in lighting and heating the rooms.
The court holding that these facts were sufficient to establish the liability of the city said:
"A city or town is not liable to a private citizen
for an injury caused by any defect or want of repair
in a city or town hall or other public building erected
and used solely for municipal purposes, or for negligence of its agents in the management of such buildings. This is because it is not liable to private actions for omission or neglect to perform a corporate
duty imposed by general laws upon all cities and
towns alike, from the performance of which it derives no compensation.
"But when a city or town does not devote such
building exclusively to municipal uses. but lets it, or
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a part of it, for its own advantage and emolument,
by receiving rents, or otherwise, it is liable while it is
so let in the same manner as a private owner would
be. Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489; S. C., Am.
Rep. 485; Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344; S. C., 23
Am. Rep. 332."
A similar situation was involved in the early Utah
case of Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91, 44 Pac. 1050.
In that case Salt Lake City had rented a portion of the City
Hall to the legislature. Plaintiff, a legislator, was attending a night session. There was an outhouse in the rear of
the building behind the City Jail. There was a light in the
hallway of the building but none in the jail yard where
the outhouse was located. Heeding a call of nature, plaintiff
went out into the darkened yard, got off of the path and
fell into an open hatchway. Our Supreme Court affirmed
a verdict for plaintiff. It should be noted that in this case
the rooms let to the legislature were in the City Hall, a
building used for governmental purposes. Furthermore,
plaintiff's injury did not occur on the demised part of the
premises. The court assumed that the city was liable as any
other landlord would be. At the outset of the opinion the
court pointed out :

"It is admitted in the record that the defendant
rented a portion of the City Hall to the legislature,
as a legislative chamber, for the purpose of holding
its session in 1889 therein, and received rent for the
same, and that the legislature was rightfully there."
(Emphasis added.)
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Referring to the place where the accident occurred the court
said:
"The yard was appurtenant to the hall, and, in
the absence of any restrictions, the members of the
legislature had a right to make a proper use thereof;"
The discussion of the duty of the city to make the yard
reasonably safe and to have the same properly lighted is
pertinent to the facts of the instant case. The Lowe case
stands for the proposition that a public body in acting as
a landlord is liable as any other landlord would be.
A good general discussion of the theory and development of the doctrine of governmental immunity is contained
in the case of Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478,
163 Pac. 670. In that case the City of Long Beach had let
a public auditorium built and maintained by it to an organization known as the Sons of St. George for the purpose of
celebrating the birthday of Queen Victoria. The auditorium
was open to the general public after the members of this
organization, their paraders and friends had been admitted.
Plaintiff's intestate was killed when a pier adjacent to the
auditorium collapsed. In an opinion holding the municipality liable, the court said :
"Again it is important to note that the true
test does not rest upon the determination as to
whether or not the municipality is reaping a monetary gain. A very large class of cases arises where
this fact is established, as where parts of public
buildings, such as a city hall, m·e leased or rented
to private individuals, when it is uniformly held that
the city in doing this thing is acting in a private
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capacity. But while it is true that the exaction of
a rent or the making of a private profit is a very
potent factor in determining the character of the
act, the converse is not true. In other words, the
act does not become governmental merely by virtue
of the fact that the city from the performance of it
reaps no direct pecuniary return. It may be and is
equally a private, proprietary act if no financial
return at all be exacted, or if the financial return
which is exacted does not amount to a profit on the
enterprise. * * *"
See also Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 54 Cal. App. 2d 651,
129 P. 2d 511.
There is one Utah decision which should be distinguished from the instant case. In Ramirez v. Ogden City,
3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P. 2d 463, part of a public recreation
hall was used by a Mexican group for a dance. The hall was
usually open to the public free of charge, but on this occasion the city received $15.00. The court regarded this payment as "merely nominal" or de minim us. Justice Crockett
took care to point out those facts showing "large expenditures made by the city for its maintenance, coupled with
lack of income therefrom, except the incidental fees referred to which may be regarded as merely nominal * * *"
It was concluded that the general character of the auditorium was governmental and that the $15.00 fee did not
deprive the operation of this character. This is not the
situation with which the court is confronted in the instant
case. Here the premises were let under a written lease for
an appreciable amount over a period of years to an enterprise not interested in furnishing education or recreation
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but only in making a profit in the commercial restaurant
business.
Even if we make the assumption (which, we submit,
is an erroneous assumption) that the maintenance of a golf
course by a public body is a governmental function, still
there is no reason why a proprietary activity cannot be
conducted at the same time on the same premises or even
under the same roof. The authorities fully support this
proposition.
In Engles v. City of New York, 6 N.Y. S. 2d 436, plaintiff was injured on alighting from an elevator to visit a
pay patient in a municipal hospital. A verdict for her was
affirmed on appeal. The court noted that the general operation of the hospital was a governmental function. As
to paying patients, however, the court said the city was
acting in a private capacity in the performance of which
it owed a duty of due care both to the patient and her visitor. The court said:
"No one will contend that if a city conducts an
activity for profit, that it is performing a governmental function. That the city enjoys both powers
-proprietary or governmental or public. It may exercise those two powers under the same roof-at one
institution."
The principal is also well illustrated by the New Bedford
and Salt Lake City cases cited supra, where the accidents
occurred in or about the city hall.
In Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto, 100 Cal. App. 2d 336,
223 P. 2d 639, plaintiff was injured in a parking lot on city
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property while en route to a community theatre situated
in a public park. Defendant urged that the theatre was
situated in a public park where public recreational facilities were located and that the theatre performed the same
general function as the park and was hence maintained in
a governmental capacity. In ruling that the theatre was
operated in a private capacity the court quoted from the
Chafor case as follows :
" 'True, it was maintained for the benefit of
the municipality in the sense that it afforded the
populace a meeting place for many forms of amusement and instruction. But in all these respects it
differed no whit from any other auditorium or assembly hall built and maintained by private capital
for the same purposes.'" (Emphasis added.)
The Defendant city had urged that the accident did not
actually occur on the theatre premises and that the parking
lot was strictly a governmental operation. In answer to
this the court said :
"The fact that the parking lot may also be used
by persons using governmental facilities operated
by appellant in the very park in which the community theatre is located, would not seem to alter its
proprietary character when used by patrons of the
theatre.
"As stated by this court in Dineen v. City and
County of San Francisco, 38 Cal. App. 2d 486, 101
P. 2d 736, judicial authorities in other jurisdictions
* * * establish the rule that if a governmental
agency permits part or whole of a building to be
used for other than governmental purposes, then the
agency is generally liable in tort to any person who
is injured by reason of the negligent maintenance
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or operation of the building, if such injury occurs
in the common hallways, passages or yard of such
building or in the portion used for nongovernmental
purposes."
The court reasoned that the parking lot fell within the
spirit of the rule. In determining whether the theatre was
governmental or proprietary, the argument that the building was used in connection with a public park did not
impress the court. That argument was dismissed with the
following language.
"It is the nature of the activity, not its location,
nor by what department carried on, nor the fact that
the facility may also be used for governmental purposes, that determines its proprietary character."

From the explanation of the law in the foregoing cases
including the Salt Lake City case, it seems to us apparent
that the leasing of the premises in the instant case was an
act performed by Salt Lake County in its proprietary capacity. The fact that the restaurant is located on a golf
course does not alter the fact that it is a private undertaking. This lease does not differ from any other lease entered
into for profit, nor does the restaurant differ from any
other commercial restaurant.
We submit that the conclusion is inescapable that the
county in leasing its premises for a fee is liable as any
other landlord would be. As a landlord, one of the duties
of the county was to maintain the hallways furnishing ingress and egress to the demised premises in a reasonably
safe condition. This is pertinent to the instant case because
piainVff was injured as he was leaving the restaurant by
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a hallway commonly used as a means of ingress and egress
to and from said restaurant.
(3) There is Ample Evidence From Which the

Jury Could Have Found That Salt Lake
County Was Guilty of Negligence Which
Proximately Contributed to Plaintiff's Injuries.
There is ample evidence from which a jury might have
found that a dangerous condition existed in the hallway
where plaintiff was injured and that said condition was
caused or was allowed to exist as a result of the negligence
of Salt Lake County all of which contributed as a proximate
cause to plaintiff's injury.
The hallway where plaintiff was injured was approximately four feet in width (three and one-half feet at the
north end) and 18 feet in length. It runs in a north-south
direction (See Exhibit 1-P). The east wall of said hallway
is constructed of glass brick which ordinarily would allow
some light to come into the passage. At the time of the
accident this wall was covered by a scoreboard which obstructed the passage of light into the hallway. There were
no artificial lights in the hallway itself. Approximately
ten feet north of the south end of the hallway a large piece
of concrete approximately 18 inches in height protrudes out
into the passageway for over one foot. As the passageway
furnished a means of ingress and egress to and from the
golf shop and coffee shop, persons were often required to
pass each other therein. There is scarcely room at the north
end of the hallway for two persons to pass side by side
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without coming into contact with the concrete abutment.
With regard to the light conditions in the hallway plaintiff
testified as follows :
(R. 122)

"Q. Now, what was the condition with respect
to light in that hallway on the occasion of this accident?
"A. Well, on the occasion of this accident, it
was about three o'clock in the afternoon ; so, the sun
would be shining from the west over this way, not
letting too much light in from the-from any place
there-because it was shining over the clubhouse,
and was especially very dark along the foot of that.
Up a little higher, you could see very well, but not
down lower; not along the passageway, you couldn't
see very well.
"Q. What was the condition of the light with
respect to the area below this concrete wall that
supports the glass brick?
"A. It was very difficult to see.
"Q. Were you watching where you were going
when" A. Yes, I was watching where I was going.
As I explained, I had spikes on, so you have to be
especially cautious when walking with pair of golf
spikes on.
"Q. Did you see that abutment before you
tripped on it?
"A. I certainly did not, because I don't believe
I tried to trip over it on purpose.
"Q. What was on the floor there, if anything,
Mr. J opes, that you can recall; what type of material
was the floor?
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"A. I am not exactly sure what was on the
floor. There seemed to be that-there might be
some rubber matting; sometimes there are in golf
shops, and so forth, where people will not slip."
Mr. Paul Gore, a professional golfer who played in the
Utah Open testified as follows :
(R. 277, 278)
"Q. Now, Mr. Gore, you participated in the
play of '55, Utah Open at Meadow Brook Golf
Course?
"A. Yes, I did.

"Q. Were you on the premises there on all of
the days that, on which that tournament was held?
"A. Yes, I came here to play practice round,
as a witness, and played through the entire tournament.
"Q. Did you have occasion to pass through
that hallway that we have been speaking about
where the plaintiff was injured?
"A. Yes, I did.
"Q. Did you observe the condition with respect
to the light in that hallway, on the various days of
the tournament?
"A. It seemed very dark to me.
"Q. Well, was the condition the same throughout those various days?
"A. There were never any changes made that
I saw.

"Q. Did you pass through the hall on each
day of the tournament?
"A. I don't think I did the first two days, no.
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"Q. Now, calling your attention, Mr. Gore, to
the afternoon of Thursday, August 25, you have
occasion to pass through the hallway on that afternoon?
"A. Yes ; I went from the lunch room to the
locker room.

And will you relate what occurred?
"A. Well, I tripped over that abutment and
almost fell to the floor.
"Q.

"Q. Then, what did you do after that?
"A. I went on into the locker room and was
there about ten minutes; then"Q.

"A.
room.

Then, what did you do?
I came back out to go back to the lunch

"Q. What, if anything, happened then?
"A. Well, there was another fellow came down
the hallway and started to pass me ; I held to him,
but he tripped over the abutment, too, and I helped
hold him up, so we didn't fall to the floor.
"Q. Was it sufficiently light in that hallway
to see those abutments"MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, just a minute"Q.

-in your opinion?

"MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I will object to
it as calling for a conclusion.
"MR. MACFARLANE : I will submit it, your
Honor ; he has testified he was there.
"THE COURT: Well, he may testify as to what
the condition of the light was, but you are-his
opinion as to whether or not there was sufficient
light or not is just calling for a conclusion, and is
not proper.
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"Q. All right, did you see the abutment before
you tripped over it?
"A. No.
"Q. Were you watching where you were going?
"Yes ; looking straight ahead."

On cross examination Mr. Gore testified as follows:
(R. 229)
"Q. What did you trip over as you went
through that hall, Mr. Gore?
"A. I tripped over an abutment.
"Q.

"A.

How do you know it was an 'abutment'?
Because I got out and felt up over it.

"Q. Got down and felt what?
"A. I wanted to know what it was; couldn't
see it clearly enough to know what it was."

Plaintiff was a patron of the lessee having made a purchase just before the injury. He was also a patron of the
golf course for admission to which he had paid a fee of
$10.00. Under these circumstances he was a business visitor as a matter of law. Hayward v. Downing, 112 Utah
508, 189 P. 2d 442; In re Wimmers Estate, 111 Utah 444,
182 P. 2d 119; Restatement of Torts, §332. The duty owed
by an owner of property to a business visitor is defined in
Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 3 Utah 2d 203,
282 P. 2d 304, as follows:
"The duty owed by an owner of land to a business visitor is to inspect and maintain his premises
in a reasonably safe condition or to warn the visitor
of any dangerous condition thereon."
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The duty of a governmental agency which lets a portion of premises, otherwise governmental for a private undertaking to maintain the common hallways and passageway in a reasonably safe condition is set out in the cases
of Lowe v. Salt Lake City, supra, Chafor v. City of Long
Beach, supra, and Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto, supra.
I

In the Lowe case the court held that the failure to provide adequate light to illuminate an open hatchway or to
warn plaintiff of the danger was negligence which would .
support a cause of action against Salt Lake City. In that
case the court said :

"* * * We think that the leaving of the
hatchway in an unguarded and unprotected condition by the defendant, as shown by the evidence,
and the failure to have any light in the yard by
which its condition could be seen, was such negligence as rendered it liable for any injury which was
caused thereby. While the owner or occupant of
premises is not an insurer of them against accidents
from their condition, still, so far as he is able to do
so by the exercise of ordinary care and vigilance, he
is bound to keep them in such a condition that persons who are rightfully using them will not be injured by any insecurity or insufficiency for the purpose to which they are put. If such owner or occupant fails in his duty in these regards, he becomes
a wrongdoer, and as such will be liable for any
injury which results as a natural consequence from
his misconduct, and which might reasonably have
been anticipated as likely to occur as a natural and
probable result thereof. * * * In the case at
bar the defendant, by invitation, and leasing of the
premises, induced the respondent to come upon them
for a legitimate purpose, knowing their dangerous
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condition, without giving him notice thereof. It
was therefore liable to him for the injury, in the
absence of contributory negligence on his part."
In Dineen v. City and County of San Francisco, 38 Cal.
App. 2d 486, 101 P. 2d 736, the court answered the very
question now before this court in the following language:
"[I] f a governmental agency permits part or
whole of a building to be used for other than governmental purposes, then the agency is generally liable
in tort to any person who is injured by reason of
the negligent maintenance or operation of the building, if such injury occurs in the common hallways,
passages or yard of such building or in the portion
used for nongovernmental purposes."

There can be no question in this case but what the
county knew of the obstruction caused by the concrete abutment. Indeed this condition was allowed to remain on the
premises for a period of six or seven years before the accident (R. 228). It is also clear that the county did not
undertake to furnish any artificial light in the hallway up
to the time of the accident. The county also knew that virtually all of the natural light furnished to said hallway
from outside sources had been blocked off by the erection
of the scoreboard against the glass block. The county's own
employee (Riley) was the person who erected the scoreboard and the dangerous condition was allowed to remain
for at least three weeks before the accident occurred (R.
242, 243) . During all of this time the county not only had
knowledge of the condition of the hallway through its employee Riley but it actively caused the same by the erection
of the scoreboard, the maintenance of the concrete obstruc-
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tion and the failure to provide any artificial light or to post
warning signs or give other notice of the hazard.
It was urged by the county at the time of trial that
it was not responsible for the safety of patrons of the Open
Tournament as it was not deriving any income from the
tournament and had in effect turned the premises over to
the Salt Lake Jaycees and the Meadow Brook Golf Club
who co-sponsored the tournament. This argument does not
answer the plain fact that the county was at all times in
possession through its lessee, Jessie Smith, and was responsible at the very least, to see that the common hallways were
maintained in a reasonably safe condition. Nor can the
county escape the fact that its employee, Riley, the person
who actually erected the scoreboard was acting within the
scope of his contract of employment in erecting the scoreboard and failing to provide artificial light. This seems
inescapable for the contract of employment actually contemplated the promotion of "men's open or amateur golf
tournament each year" (Ex. 24-P) and the Utah Open was
conducted at Meadow Brook just as it would be conducted
at any privately owned club. Riley's contract gave him
express authority to conduct such a tournament. How can
it be said that he was not acting within the scope of his
authority in the planning and conduct of the tournament?
The county in holding this tournament was not only fulfilling its duty as a golf course to the game of golf in taking
its turn to hold the Utah Open (R. 257) but there were
likely decided benefits in doing so in the form of increased
patronage of the lessee during the tournament (the county
got a share of the gross proceeds) and the focusing of public
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interest on the course during the actual play of the tournament which would result in an increase of future green fees.
Even had the county (contrary to the facts in this case)
relinquished complete control of the premises and had there
been no lessee in possession or employee acting for it, it
would be liable for injury caused by the dangerous condition thereon at the time the tournament opened. See § 359,
Restatement of Torts and Comments (a) and (c) to said
sections. Jopes was on the premises as a participant in the
tournament. Salt Lake County could certainly not have
expected that the sponsors of the tournament would install
artificial lights and remove the concrete obstruction. Nor
could they reasonably expect the scoreboard to be removed
before the completion of the tournament.
In summary we submit that there was ample evidence
from which a jury might reasonably have found that a
dangerous condition existed in the hallway where plaintiff
was injured and that the county failed to exercise reasonable care to make said hallway safe or to warn plaintiff
of the danger therein. The evidence in the instant case not
only shows the existence of a dangerous condition and a
failure to warn of the hazard but also compels the conclusion that the hazard was created by the county's employee
acting within the scope of his employment.
(4) The Evidence Does Not Compel a Conclusion

That Plaintiff Was Guilty of Contributory
Negligence as a Matter of Law.
The testimony of J opes was that he had been in the
hallway before the time of the accident; that he did not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
see the concrete obstruction on said occasions and did not
know it was there until he tripped over it (R. 166). He
said that the hallway was dimly lighted; that he was watching where he was going but could not see the abutment
before he fell (R. 122). His testimony was corroborated
by Paul Gore who also testified as to the light conditions
and who though watching where he was going also tripped
over the abutment and caught another golfer as he fell over
the same (R. 277, 278). From this testimony it appears
that the hallway was neither extremely dark nor was it
light, but was dimly lighted particularly below the concrete
foundation to which the abutment was attached. It further
appears that a traveler's view of any obstruction along the
wall was so obscured by the light conditions as to prevent
his seeing it. It is also significant that J opes was passing
another golfer in the hallway at the time of the accident
and was probably devoting that degree of care in doing so
that any other person would have done in passing someone
in a narrow hallway. Is it for the court to say that no reasonable minds could find that J opes was exercising the care
of a reasonably prudent person in traversing the hallway?
How can it be said from these facts that J opes was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
This court in Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Company,
3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P. 2d 304, under circumstances much
less favorable to the plaintiff than those in the instant case
refused to hold that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. In that case Rogalski was
engaged in steam cleaning a truck on a ramp owned by
defendant. There was a tank of caustic acid on the ramp
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with no lid on it, but Rogalski's view of the tank was obscured by a mist caused by the steam he was using to clean
the truck. He testified that if he had stepped back "and
waited a minute the steam would clear." Instead of waiting
for the mist to clear, however, he felt his way around the
truck and stumbled into the vat of acid. Of these facts the
court said:
"It has been frequently announced by this court
that contributory negligence is a question for the
jury unless all reasonable men must draw the same
conclusion from the facts as they are shown. Shafer
v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah 46, 234 P. 300, 38
A. L. R. 1523; Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91,
44 P. 1050, 57 Am. St. Rep. 708; Baker v. Decker,
117 Utah 15, 212 P. 2d 679. As was said in Linden
v. Anchor Min. Co., 20 Utah 134, 58 P. 355, 358:
"'Where there is uncertainty as to the existence of either negligence or contributory negligence, the question is not one of law, but of
fact, and to be settled by a jury ; and this,
whether the uncertainty arises from a conflict
in the testimony, or because, the facts being
undisputed, fair-minded men will honestly draw
different conclusions from them.'
"In the present case, although there is no conflict in the evidence on this question, the triers of
the facts might justifiably conclude that a person,
acting with due regard for his own safety and with
no awareness of the presence of a dangerous liquid,
could not be required to inspect the premises for
possible hazards. * * *"

Lowe v. Salt Lake City, supra, involved a similar question. In that case plaintiff, because of insufficient light
stepped into an open hatchway and was injured. The court
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concluded that he was not guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law in walking into the dark yard beside the
path to the outhouse. See also Baker v. Decker, 117 Utah
15, 212 P. 2d 679, where the court held that contributory
negligence is a question of fact for the jury unless all reasonable minds are compelled by undisputed evidence to find
that plaintiff did not exercise reasonable care for his own
safety. Commenting on this the court said:

"* * * Ordinary reasonable persons wiU
trip over objects, stumble over obstructions, slip on
slick surfaces and fall into holes or excavations.
Even though they may see the object they sometimes fail to comprehend and anticipate the incident
which precipitates the injury. Usually whether a
reasonable person would have properly appraised
the situation and escaped injury is for a jury to determine." (Emphasis added.)
One of the defendants suggested to the trial judge
below that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law in traversing the hallway instead of taking an alternate route. The hallway was maintained for
the use of patrons such as plaintiff. He had no reason to
expect, in the absence of any warning, that there was a
dangerous condition in said hallway nor that he would be
taking an unusual risk in using the same. This defendant's
contention in this respect seems to us too ridiculous to require rebuttal. In any event it is fully answered by the
cases of Baker v. Decke1·, supra, and Moore v. 11Iiles, 108
Utah 167, 158 P. 2d 676.
We submit that the issue of contributory negligence
was under the circumstances of this case a question for the
fact finders and should have been submitted to the jury.
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT JOSEPH MICHAEL RILEY.
Riley was employed by the county as a manager of the
course. It was his duty among other things to maintain the
facilities. He had both the right and the duty to see that
changes were made in the facilities if in his judgment they
were necessary. He knew of the obstruction in the hallway;
he knew of the traffic in the hallway and particularly that
people often passed each other and needed all possible clearance in the narrow passage; he knew that there were no
artificial lights to illuminate the obstruction; it was his
duty to install lights if the same were reasonably necessary;
he caused the scoreboards to be erected which blocked out
the natural light from said passageway, and when the hazard was complete, he sat back with full knowledge of the
hazardous condition until the accident occurred. Certainly
it was a jury question as to whether or not Riley was guilty
of negligence which proximately contributed to plaintiff's
injuries. In our opinion the evidence compelled a finding
that Riley was negligent. In any event it certainly must be
concluded that reasonable minds might have found that all
or any of the acts and omissions above outlined constituted
actionable negligence. The case, therefore should have been
allowed to go to the jury on the issue of Riley's liability.
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POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT MEADOW BROOK GOLF CLUB.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT JUNIOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.
The Salt Lake Jaycees and the Meadow Brook Golf
Club were co-sponsors of the Utah Open Golf Tournament.
The tournament was planned and managed by a general
committee of three, including Kipp of the Jaycees, Gilbert
of Meadow Brook and Riley the golf pro. Meadow Brook
Golf Club and the Jaycees furnished supervision, management and labor and in return for their joint contribution
each of the said co-sponsors, according to agreement, divided the net profits of the tournament. These profits
amounted to several hundreds of dollars. This is the clearest case of the legal relationship of "joint venture."
See e. g. Kaumans v. White
Star Gas & Oil Co., 92 Utah 24, 63 P. 2d 231.
30 Am. Jur. 680.
This being true each of said defendants are jointly and
severally liable as joint tort feasors for personal injuries
sustained by others as a result of negligence in the conduct
of the joint enterprise or from negligence of their agents
or employees acting within the scope of their employment.

Kaumans v. White Star Gas & Oil Co., supra.
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Since the liability of Meadow Brook Golf Club and the Salt
Lake Jaycees is the same, Points III and IV will be discussed together.
We have already pointed out under Point I (3) supra,
that plaintiff's injuries were caused by a hazardous condition existing in the hallway where he was injured. There
are two compelling reasons why Meadow Brook Golf Club
and the Jaycees as well as the other named defendants were
responsible to plaintiff for this hazard: ( 1) The Golf Club
and the Jaycees as possessors of the Meadow Brook Golf
Club during the duration of the tournament and as proprietors of the tournament owed a duty to plaintiff to exercise
reasonable care to see that the premises were in a reasonably safe condition, and (2) Riley in placing the scoreboard
over the east wall of the passageway was acting as the
agent of the Golf Club and of the Jaycees.
As to the first of said theories, the Golf Club and
Jaycees took possession of the course for the conduct of the
tournament and invited participants and spectators from
whom they exacted an admission fee. The greens and fairways were, of course, essential to their operation. No less
essential, however, were the locker rooms, rest rooms, and
golf shop, all lo~ated within the clubhouse. The plaintiff,
J opes, was on the course by invitation and for the purpose
of the tournament. He had paid the required admission
fee which became part of the income collected by the coadventurers. Spectators of the tournament paid a "gallery
fee" which came into the same hands. The duty of the
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Jaycees and the Golf Club toward J opes is defined in thE
Restatement of Torts as follows :
"Topic 1. Liability of Possessors of Land tc
Persons Thereon.
"Title A. Definitions.
"§ 329.

*
*
* * *

*

*

*

"Comment:
"a. Meaning of 'possessor of land.' The words
'possessor of land,' as used in the Restatement of
this subject, mean:
"'1. A person who is in occupation of
land with intent to control it, or

"'2.

* * *'

"Title E. Special Liability of Possessors of
Land to Business Visitors.
"§ 343. Dangerous Conditions Known to or
Discoverable by Possessor.

"A possessor of land is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural
or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he
" ' (a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition which,
if known to him, he should realize as involving
an unreasonable risk to them, and
"'(b) has no reason to believe that they
will discover the condition or realize the risk
involved therein, and
" ' (c) invites or permits them to enter or
remain upon the land without exercising reasonable care

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

47
" ' ( i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or

" '(ii) to give a warning adequate to
enable them to avoid the harm without relinquishing any of the services which they
are entitled to receive, if the possessor is
a public utility.'"
As pointed out supra, page 35, the undisputed evidence
compels the conclusion that plaintiff was a business visitor
under the facts of the instant case. (Even had he been a
mere gratuitous licensee, however, the standard of care
was not met, See § 342, Restatement of Torts.)
It is undisputed that the Golf Club and the Jaycees
knew of the condition existing there and invited plaintiff
upon the premises without doing anything to alter the condition or to warn plaintiff. Certainly it was for the jury
to say whether or not the condition involved an "unreasonable risk" and whether or not the co-adventurers had reason
to believe that plaintiff would not discover the condition
or realize the danger.
It is no answer to urge that the Golf Club and Jaycees
had no right to alter the physical conditions which existed
at the course. They cannot absolve themselves from liability for injuries caused to persons whom they invited on
the premises by any such simple device. No exception is
made in the above stated rule of law which would permit
proprietors to invite and admit patrons to premises they
possess and then contend they had no duty for the safety
of said patrons because they had no right to alter the
premises. Another reason why this contention must fail
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is that one of the most significant contributing ,factors tc
the hazard was the placement of the scoreboard. This board
was constructed for the express purpose of the joint enter.
prise in putting on the Utah Open. A jury might well have
found, and we think would be compelled to find, that the
placement and maintenance of this scoreboard was a decision to be made by the general tournament committee and
a matter over which said committee had the right of supervision, direction and control.
It cannot be reasonably concluded, as a matter of law,
that the co-adventurers had no responsibility for conditions
existing in the building. Their operation required the use
of the building-particularly the locker rooms, rest rooms
and golf shop. The securing of change to pay a caddy as
plaintiff was doing was a necessary activity for any tournament. When golfers were invited to the tournament the
invitation necessarily extended to the clubhouse as well as
the greens and hallways.

As a second reason for the liability of the Golf Club
and the Jaycees, we submit that there was ample evidence
from which the jury could have found that Riley was acting
for said defendants as an agent in the placement of the
scoreboard. We have already shown why the placement of
the scoreboard over the glass wall of the hallway constituted negligence. Riley testified that the board was made
for the "express purpose of using in the Utah Open Tournament" ( R. 260) . The placement of the board was taken up
by Riley with Kipp and Gilbert, the other members of the
r~·cneral committee, as one of the items of business of the
tournament (R. 243, 244, 309). Although Kipp did not
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recall the discussion Gilbert did remember a discussion as
to the placement of the sign (R. 309).
It would appear that the actual location of the sign

was made more as a result of Riley's judgment than that of
the other two general chairmen. The court should note that
Riley was making a number of decisions after having consulted the co-sponsors. The reason for this is explained by
Riley himself as follows :
(R. 236)

"They were using me of my knowledge and experience in running open tournaments."
The very fact that Riley was one of the three members of
the general committee seems to us conclusive evidence that
he was acting for said committee and said co-sponsors in
performing work in furtherance of the tournament. It is
undisputed that what he did was with the full knowledge
and consent of the other two committee members. The very
placement of the sign was a task done in furtherance of
the enterprise conducted by the co-adventurers. We think
that this court will agree with us that there is sufficient
evidence from which a jury might find that Riley was acting as agent for the enterprise and for the co-adventurers
in placing the scoreboard where it was placed.
It follows that the liability of the defendants Meadow
Brook Golf Club and Salt Lake Jaycees was an issue which
should have been submitted to the jury.
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CONCLUSION
From the foregoing we submit that the trial cour
erred in dismissing the complaint and that the case shoul1
be remanded to the district court for a new trial to de
termine the liability of each of the defendants.

Respectfully submitted,
GRANT MACFARLANE JR.,
for VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Suite 300, 65 South Main
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Appellant
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